


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DIRECTORATE OF  
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# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

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51

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30 October 1968

# *Central Intelligence Bulletin*

## CONTENTS

South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)

Czechoslovakia: The federalization bill is to be signed today. (Page 2)

Rumania - Warsaw Pact: Rumanian authorities have agreed in principle to joint maneuvers in Rumania in 1969. (Page 3)

USSR-Yugoslavia: Moscow has again attacked Yugoslav policy. (Page 4)

Japan-USSR: The two countries' Communist parties are becoming further estranged over the Czechoslovak issue. (Page 5)

Africa - Middle East: Locust plague conditions may persist for several years. (Page 7)

Lebanon-Israel: Israeli shelling (Page 8)

Syria: New cabinet (Page 8)


Peru: Commercial ties with Eastern Europe (Page 8)

Mauritius: Soviet embassy (Page 9)




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I CORPS



NORTH VIETNAM



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**[ South Vietnam:** A review of allied efforts in I Corps during September shows that despite limited progress, the over-all status of pacification there remains unchanged.

In Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces, security improved in some areas close to the main population centers as a result of the low level of enemy activity and of numerous allied operations. Following an allied sweep through Vinh Loc District, east of Hue, the government was able to assert some influence in the area, which had been under tight Viet Cong control. The typhoon which hit these two provinces in early September caused severe damage, however, and diverted allied resources from economic development projects and some security tasks.

In Quang Nam and Quang Ngai provinces, the enemy maintained a high level of guerrilla activity; security, therefore, continued to deteriorate. Communist political forces have established a large number of village "liberation committees" in both of these provinces. In Quang Ngai, the Viet Cong also destroyed office buildings in the province's "model village" and probably succeeded in further damaging the government's image among the local people. Meanwhile, in Quang Nam, poor security conditions in two additional districts, Dien Ban and Hoa Vang, have forced the Revolutionary Development teams there into an essentially defensive posture.

Throughout I Corps, security was generally maintained in the urban areas and along the main lines of communication, particularly Route 1. Joint South Vietnamese - US refugee resettlement plans are also making some advances. In Vinh Loc the program has begun to assist 13,000 people to return to their original homes, and refugees are being resettled in place in Da Nang city. Moreover, the number of ralliers to the government in I Corps reached its highest level in several months.

25X1

30 Oct 68

Central Intelligence Bulletin

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Czechoslovakia: Czechoslovak leaders have gone to Bratislava to witness the signing of the federalization bill today. The leadership delegation, which includes Dubcek, President Svoboda, and Premier Cernik, probably will also take part in Slovak commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Czechoslovak first republic.

The federalization bill calls for separate Czech and Slovak national governments under a reduced central government in Prague. The legislation, however, is incomplete and many problems must be resolved before the new system is introduced on 1 January 1969. Czechs and Slovaks have not yet come to an agreement on the responsibilities to be given to a bicameral National Assembly, or on the detailed division of powers between the federal government and the respective national governments.

[ There was an anti-Soviet demonstration last night in Bratislava after the Czechoslovak leaders had arrived. Soviet troops did not intervene, however, and thus far the occupation command appears content to let local authorities handle the situation. More demonstrations are expected in Bratislava today as the Slovaks mark the 50th anniversary of their decision to form a common state with the Czechs. ]

The anti-Soviet demonstrations on 28 October were nationwide. In Prague they appear to have been led by a few hundred students who attracted additional marchers at various times. There were apparently no injuries or property damage. Some 85 Prague youths were arrested, but later released. Although the demonstrations did not develop into riots, the Soviets and the Czechoslovak conservatives may consider that at least they illustrated the leadership's lack of control. Moscow may use the anniversary incidents as a lever to exert new pressures on the Czechoslovaks to hasten the pace of "normalization." [REDACTED]

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Rumania - Warsaw Pact: Rumanian authorities reportedly have accepted in principle a Soviet proposal to hold joint maneuvers in Rumania sometime in 1969.

The maneuvers presumably would not be held before next spring, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Bucharest is wary of the proposal by adding that final agreement requires a government-to-government accord, a procedure Bucharest has insisted upon since mid-1965.

The accord would spell out exactly the number of troops involved and the countries sending troops. It would also specify the proposed dates for troops to enter and leave Rumania as well as the precise area and nature of the maneuvers. No joint Pact maneuvers have been held in Rumania since October 1962. [REDACTED]

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USSR-Yugoslavia: Moscow has again formally attacked Yugoslav policy in the aftermath of Czechoslovakia.

The Soviets have shown their displeasure this time in a letter from the Soviet party central committee delivered to Marshal Tito on 19 October. Deputy Foreign Minister Pavicevic recently told the US ambassador that the letter, although critical of Yugoslav policy, also asserted that Belgrade's fears of a Soviet military threat are "unfounded." The note did not clarify, however, the Soviet view of the boundaries of the "socialist system" which the USSR has pledged to defend. Belgrade fears that this pledge could be used as a pretext for intervention.

Belgrade judges the letter to be somewhat milder in tone than a note of 30 August. That note produced an unyielding Yugoslav reply and reportedly touched off a shouting match between Tito and the Soviet ambassador.

Moscow has also treated Soviet-Yugoslav relations in the party journal Kommunist. An article in the latest issue suggests that Yugoslavia is a part of the "socialist system," but does not pin this down. The ambiguity suggests that Moscow wishes to keep Belgrade uncertain about its intentions in hopes of quieting Yugoslav criticism of Soviet policy. Judging from Tito's truculent speech of 20 October and the recent rebuttal of the Kommunist article in the Yugoslav press, the Soviet pressure has as yet had no effect.

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Japan-USSR: The Japan Communist Party (JCP) and the CPSU are becoming further estranged over the Czechoslovak issue.

The latest round of a polemical exchange was set off by the Japanese party's condemnation in late August of the Soviet intervention. Moscow has severely censured the JCP for its criticisms. On 26 October the JCP party organ Akahata responded by equating the Soviets with those "Maoist elements" that condemn the JCP as "antirevolutionary."

Last February a Soviet party mission led by Party Secretary Suslov made an unsuccessful attempt to patch up relations. A return JCP mission to Moscow in early August accomplished nothing, due in part to Soviet irritation at the JCP's support for the policies of the Czechoslovak leadership. The JCP permanent representative in Moscow has returned to Japan and shows no sign of going back to his post. Moreover, the JCP apparently had no contact with politburo member Shelepin on his recent visit to Japan, ostensibly for consultations with Japanese trade unionists.


The JCP's public denigration of both the Soviets and the Chinese and its display of independence from "big power chauvinists" are popular in Japan. These tactics are a continuation of the party's policy of placing primary emphasis on domestic political interests.

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## Desert Locust Plague Continues to Grow



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Africa - Middle East: The locust plague is far from contained despite extensive control measures, and plague conditions may persist for several years.

Several previously unaffected areas will probably be infested in the next few months. Locusts in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia and Somalia are moving toward Kenya, which they will probably reach by December. Tanzania and Uganda may also be infested. Additional swarms are settling along the Red Sea coast. Smaller swarms in eastern Sudan, Chad, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania are generally moving northward toward the Mediterranean, but are not considered a serious threat.

In East Africa, equipment and supplies available to the regional organization combatting the locusts remain inadequate despite some assistance from the UN and other donors. The morale of the comparatively few personnel engaged in this campaign is also low after more than a year of widespread antilocust work with no end in sight.

Large hordes of locusts now are breeding in Saudi Arabia, which has done little to eradicate them, although some Saudi officials are beginning to recognize the problem. If these locusts move across the Red Sea into Africa in 1969, the present regional control organization and the various governments involved would probably be faced with an even worse situation. [REDACTED]

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Lebanon-Israel: The Israelis twice have shelled Lebanese villages in the past two days, and have warned Lebanon to watch its territory more closely to cut off terrorist infiltrators. Israel has claimed that recent attacks on Israeli settlements originated in Lebanon and the Israeli shelling was in retaliation of these attacks. In the past Syria has sent terrorists into Israel via Lebanon, despite attempts by Lebanon to stop attacks through its territory for fear of Israeli reprisals. [REDACTED]

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Syria: Yesterday's cabinet change in Damascus seems to represent only another round in the country's perennial game of governmental musical chairs. The realignment within the radical Baathist leadership is an apparent victory for Minister of Defense Hafiz al-Asad. The political position of strongman Salah Jadid, who has ruled Syria from behind the scenes since February 1966, is still unclear. Asad appears to have strengthened his own position with the military and has appointed a number of top military figures to the new cabinet. [REDACTED]

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Peru: The military government is taking up efforts begun by its predecessor to expand commercial ties with Eastern Europe. Since 3 October it has already hosted a Czechoslovak commercial mission, ratified a commercial accord with Hungary, and begun economic talks with the Soviet Union. It also plans to sign commercial and cultural agreements with Rumania, and had gone so far as to set up the signing ceremony for Foreign Minister Manescu's brief stop in Lima on 25 October, only to be told by Manescu that he was not empowered to sign agreements. [REDACTED]

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Mauritius: Prime Minister Ramgoolam is recommending that the cabinet approve a Soviet proposal to establish an embassy on Mauritius. When it attained independence in March 1968, Mauritius recognized both the Soviet Union and Communist China. The prime minister told the US chargé that the Soviets were not offering any technical assistance or other inducement, but he hoped they might want to provide some economic help in the future. Ramgoolam's efforts to secure from the West an increase in much-needed assistance for the small Indian Ocean island have met with little success.

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